The study examines how to mitigate the cultural differences inherent in global, multisource, information systems development outsourcing projects. Its main finding is that the influence of informal control and interorganizational learning on formal control does not remain constant. Rather, it changes over time, from providing operational information to reducing formal management efforts. In turn, transparency created through formal management mechanisms provides room for effective informal control mechanisms and interorganizational learning. This interplay supports the mitigation of cultural differences through the harmonization of work-related values and practices.
Introduction
Worldwide, companies benefit from sophisticated sourcing strategies that rely on both near-and offshore destinations. Unlike offshore outsourcing, nearshore outsourcing aims to mitigate offshorespecific challenges, such as significant time zone differences or language barriers, as well as to exploit nearshorespecific advantages, such as closer interactions through geographic proximity (e.g., Meyer and Stobbe 2007) . Internationally operating vendors thus increasingly take advantage of hybrid global delivery models and organize service delivery across off-, near-, and onshore locations ). Yet organizing smooth global service delivery remains challenging, especially in constellations in which client companies deal with multiple, globally distributed vendors on a single project. For example, in global, multisource projects for information systems development (ISD), both national cultures and multiple organizational cultures must converge. The perceived cultural distance between client and vendor thus increases, which requires more integrated management approaches to address greater demand for communication and coordination (Carmel and Agarwal 2001; Hildenbrand et al. 2007) .
Prior research in the global ISD and outsourcing domains spans multiple streams and thus focuses on various management aspects. Therefore, a large part of empirical research in global IS outsourcing analyzes cultural differences on the national, organizational, and individual level and how to deal with these differences from a project management point of view (e.g., David et al. 2008; Iacovou and Nakatsu 2008; Winkler et al. 2007) . In this context, it has been shown that in particular control mechanisms as well as interorganizational learning contribute to the mitigation of cultural differences (Gregory 2010b) .
Literature in the global ISD and outsourcing domains covers numerous studies considering control issues, such as the role of contracts (e.g., Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan 2008; Lacity and Willcocks 1998) or other formal control mechanisms (e.g., Tiwana 2008), as well as the input of informal control mechanisms (Holmström Olsson et al. 2008) . Also, there are several studies focusing on interorganizational learning, mainly in relation to cross-cultural (Nicholson and Sahay 2001; Vlaar et al. 2008; Walsham 2002) and knowledge (e.g., Kotlarsky et al. 2008; Leonardi and Bailey 2008; Nicholson and Sahay 2004 ) issues. However, while these studies cover control mechanisms and interorganizational learning separately, the existing literature to the best of our knowledge has not investigated in more detail on the relationship between control mechanisms and interorganizational learning against the background of cultural differences (Gregory 2010b) , in particular in an analysis that features both the client's and multiple vendors' perspectives.
Seeking to address this gap, we adopt an exploratory research design and analyze the interplay of formal and informal control with interorganizational learning in global, multisource, ISD outsourcing projects. Accordingly, we seek to answer the following research question:
How do formal and informal control mechanisms and interorganizational learning interact and contribute to the mitigation of cultural differences in global, multisource, ISD outsourcing projects?
To answer this question, we apply an exploratory case study design with a global, multisource, ISD outsourcing project initiated by a large German financial institute as the research object. The objective of this project was to reengineer the financial institute's online banking systems, and the project team included approximately 100 people from five different organizations (client and four vendors), distributed across Germany, Spain, Brazil, and India.
We begin our account of this project and the findings based on it by presenting theoretical foundations for our understanding of formal and informal control, as well as interorganizational learning. After we describe the case study, the underlying research methodology, and the analysis results, we discuss the findings in the light of previous literature. The final section summarizes key findings and provides some implications for research and practice.
Theoretical Background: Control Dynamics and Interorganizational Learning
Prior studies on domestic IS outsourcing emphasize the general importance of social capabilities, which not only facilitate intra-organizational cooperation but also foster mutual trust and performance among client organizations and external IS vendors (Dibbern et al. 2003) . However, a recent review of IS outsourcing practices reveals that global IS outsourcing projects actually cope with even more challenges (Lacity et al. 2009 ). In the global context of ISD outsourcing, the need for social competency is significant because individual participants must cope with the global sourcingspecific distance between the client and vendor. This so called client-vendor distance encompasses not only geographic, economic, and political distance but also and in particular cultural differences (Vogt et al. 2009; Winkler et al. 2007) .
In this regard governance can be conducted by the joint reliance on different governance or control mechanisms such as informal and formal control mechanisms for the governance of economic transaction (Adler 2001; Bradach and Eccles 1989; Cannon et al. 2000) . In the global IS outsourcing domain it has been shown that successful control balancing using combinations of different control modes is a promising way to manage cultural differences inherent in such projects (Gregory 2010a) .
Literature on control suggests two basic modes: formal and social control. Formal control involves the establishment and application of codified rules, goals, and procedures to define, monitor, and evaluate performance (Das and Teng 2001) . They usually involve explicit information transfers and include for example formal reporting guidelines and frequent meetings between key representatives (Inkpen and Currall 2004) . Prior research in global IS outsourcing has employed a control perspective to show how the contract between the client and the vendor is enforced via formal behavior and outcome control; accordingly, the client controls the behavior and outcomes of his vendor (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003) . Social control involves trust-based mechanisms and operates via the development of shared values and norms (Das and Teng 2001) . According to Das and Teng (1998) , the key difference between formal and social control is that "formal control is more of a strict evaluation of performance while social control is about dealing with people." (p. 501). Examples for social controls include socialization, training, and spontaneous interactions between representatives of the exchange partners (Das and Teng 1998) . In the global IS outsourcing literature, social control has most often been conceptualized as informal control (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1996) .
An expanding body of research notes control dynamics and examines how and why control modes change across project phases. For example, Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003) analyze the evolution of control portfolios in information systems development (ISD) outsourcing projects and reveal several factors that influence the choice and evolution of the control mechanisms. To extend such research, Kirsch (2004) describes how control modes change during three project phases of internal global IS deployment projects. Changes in the control mode appear triggered by factors from three categories: project context, stakeholder context, and global context.
Besides control, also interorganizational learning has been shown to contribute to the mitigation of cultural differences in global IS outsourcing projects. On the one hand, interorganizational learning comprises the accumulation of relevant business, functional, and clientspecific knowledge, as vendors must accumulate business knowledge about their client's application domain, functional knowledge about the client's IT infrastructure and systems, and specific recognition of its functional requirements and processes (Dibbern et al. 2008) . On the other hand, interorganizational learning pertains the important topic of knowledge transfer in global IS outsourcing projects. The existing literature repeatedly demonstrates positive effects of successful knowledge transfer (e.g., Kotlarsky and Oshri 2005; Nicholson and Sahay 2004; Oshri et al. 2007; Rottman 2008) , and many researchers cite a lack of knowledge transfer as a major drawback for global ISD outsourcing projects (e.g., David et al. 2008; Dibbern et al. 2008; Gupta and Raval 1999; Kliem 2004; Leonardi and Bailey 2008) . And third, interorganizational learning in a global context also refers to cross-cultural issues and the development of cultural intelligence, defined as "a form of firmlevel capability in functioning effectively Krishna et al. 2004; Levina and Vaast 2008) . In summary, both control mechanisms as well as interorganizational learning have been shown to individually contribute to the mitigation of cultural differences. However, there remains little understanding of the interplay of formal and informal control mechanisms with interorganizational learning or how the interaction might contribute to mitigate cultural differences in global, multisource, ISD outsourcing projects. Furthermore, most of the preceding studies address dyadic client-vendor relationships, whereas the specific challenges of multisource projects remain unconsidered.
Research Methods
As outlined, we lack sufficient knowledge about the interplay of control and learning in global, multisource, IS outsourcing projects. Therefore, to increase this understanding, as well as to reveal the interactive effects on cultural differences, the present qualitative research features an in-depth, exploratory, singlecase study (Stebbins 2001; Yin 2003) . The subsequent sections describe the underlying case (3.1) as well as the procedures used for data collection (3.2) and analysis (3.3). A chronology of the overall research process is presented at the end of this chapter.
Case Description
The primary unit of analysis was a global ISD outsourcing project to reengineer a financial institution's online banking system. The project was initiated because the old system's technology required a high degree of costly expertise, and its maintenance was set to expire soon. Thus, the financial institution (BANK) decided to migrate its system to a new technology. To develop this new system, BANK applied a multisourcing strategy to reduce the risks of dependence. Therefore, it included four vendors in the project, as summarized in ARCHITECT, a German boutique consulting firm, designed the architectural framework of the new online banking system. IMPLEMENT was a leading international IT vendor for the financial services sector and operated and maintained BANK's old online banking system. During the reengineering project, IMPLEMENT had the responsibility to create the functional and technical design documents and implement the new online banking system. To provide these services at the required quality and cost levels, IMPLEMENT chose a global delivery model that involved four locations in Spain and a captive center in Brazil. Another vendor, SCREEN, specialized in web development and was based in Germany. It was responsible for the frontend screen design. Finally, a large IT vendor with international operations, TEST was responsible for the software testing, conducted in a testing facility in India. Thus, the project featured both nearshore and offshore outsourcing.
Thus BANK's sourcing strategy for this project featured not only a global context but also the involvement of multiple vendors. In addition to national cultural differences resulting from the geographically distributed setting, the various organizational cultures played major roles in the project. These national and organizational cultural differences became especially visible in work-related values and practices, as the following examples indicate.
In particular, BANK's project manager recognized the differences on the national level: Beyond national cultural differences, organizational cultural differences became visible in the newly established intervendor cooperation. All the vendors previously had been involved in projects with BANK, but they had not interacted with one another in a multivendor setting before. Against this background, different work practices came to the surface and challenged the cooperation. For example, ARCHITECT was represented by a team of five experienced experts who followed an onshore delivery model. IMPLEMENT's 50-person implementation team spread across five geographic locations and possessed various competences and practice levels. ARCHITECT thus initially had trouble understanding the challenges that faced IMPLEMENT's large, distributed project team, including the need to scale the work to a distributed team of developers in both Brazil and Spain. A project manager from ARCHITECT explained: IMPLEMENT's managers confirmed this discrepancy in work practices and explained that their global delivery model required them to look at the system at large first, and then split up the task into preferably self-contained sub-tasks. Next they could match the sub-tasks with the competence profiles of different developers to distribute the work effectively. Therefore, the distributed teams worked mostly independently -as was crucial for the geographically distributed setup.
Data Collection
The data collection phase comprised both interviews (primary data) and documents generated during the course of the project (secondary data). Thus, we supplemented and triangulated our interview data with project presentations, tracking sheets, status reports, and lessons-learned documents to create a rich data set. In the course of the primary data collection (taking place in July and August 2009 as well as in November and early December 2009), we conducted 25 interviews with 22 respondents at both client and vendor locations. We present the demographic information about these interview partners in Table 2 . Except for one conference call with a respondent located in Brazil, all the interviews took place in person: 15 in Germany and 9 in Spain. Each interview lasted between one and two hours, such that we obtained more than 38 hours of interviews. Because BANK's corporate policy did not permit recordings of any interviews (with either BANK's or the vendors' employees), we took extensive notes, ultimately producing more than 130 pages of write-up notes.
In terms of the distribution of interviews across organizations, differences resulted from different team sizes for the parties involved. For example, ARCHI-TECT's project team included five experienced experts who were located onshore, whereas IMPLEMENT's team at times consisted of more than 50 people with various competencies and practice levels who worked in geographically distributed areas, including both near-and offshore locations. Table 3 clarifies the distribution of interviewees.
The interview partners represented different organizational levels in BANK and three of the four vendor companies, with various profiles and roles that implied different skill and knowledge levels. We unfortunately did not have an opportunity to interview any representatives from TEST, despite repeated inquiries. The diversity of respondents ensures that our study features various organizational perspectives, hierarchical perspectives, and professional perspectives. The interviews were conversational in nature, conducted using an interview guideline with semistructured questions. We transcribed our field notes after each interview session and used these notes to identify appropriate questions for subsequent interviews. Thus, we refined the interview questions multiple times during the course of the data collection and analysis, especially when we realized needs for additional information to confirm emerging themes or substantiate initial findings.
Data Analysis
The data analysis began with coding of the interview write-up notes. We identified, named, and categorized phenomena related to our research question, through comparisons of the interviews with one another and the available secondary data. The preliminary codes included concepts such as "project setup" or "initialization phase." After we identified main conceptual themes from the interview data, according to their high frequency, we again compared all the interview data with the conceptual themes to find additional quotes or parallel statements from other interviewees. Thus, we substantiated our findings and managed to identify the main management mechanisms and learning issues from the primary data. Near the end of the analysis process, we compared our findings with the available literature, to conceptualize the emerging themes in our data. During this comparison, we elaborated on the identified themes by developing the descriptive categories into more meaningful notions at a higher level of abstraction. Thus the research team engaged in intensive considerations throughout the process to ensure no existing theory was forced onto the data. For the coding and conceptualization process, we used AT-LAS.ti. Table 4 illustrates the chronology of the overall research process.
Findings
From this exploratory case study, two key findings emerged. The first finding pertains the interplay of formal and informal controls and interorganizational learning in global, multisource, ISD outsourcing projects (Sect. 4.1), while the second finding relates to the mitigating effect of these mechanisms on cultural differences in such projects (Sect. 4.2). In the following, we explain how these findings arose, describe them, and support the findings with illustrative empirical quotes from the case study interviews.
Finding 1: Interplay of Formal and Informal Controls and Interorganizational Learning
We start the description of this finding with the influence of formal controls on informal control and interorganizational learning: our data suggest that implementing formal control mechanisms encourages the emergence of both informal control mechanisms and interorganizational learning processes because the formal controls create transparency about the essential project parameters.
In the focal project for example, the reengineering had tight deadlines because the software support for the old system's underlying technology was set to expire. Therefore, tight project management was of particular importance, and BANK used an in-depth work breakdown structure, or traceability matrix, as a formal control mechanism. The traceability matrix originally came from the project plan, which was compiled by all involved parties. To cope with emerging differences in quality perceptions and accuracy, the parties enhanced the work breakdown structure to reflect work tasks with a very high level of detail. According to project manager, This traceability matrix fulfilled its function as a formal control mechanism because it helped keep track of the overall project progress and quickly identified plan variances and the need for countermeasures. Moreover, it influenced the emergence of informal control mechanisms and interorganizational learning. Specifically, by using the in-depth traceability matrix, the involved parties gained detailed insights into their different areas of responsibility, the associated work portfolios, and the resulting tasks for their sub-teams; they also recognized cross-organizational interdependencies. The interviewees indicated that such transparency significantly contributed to the lack of conflict or even bargaining about responsibilities and task assignments. Rather, the project team could direct its primary focus toward establishing a multisource cooperation, in terms of both growing as a team and establishing an integrated service delivery process. A project manager from one of the vendor companies explained the absence of bargaining as follows:
Our clear focus was on tight control of the project's overall progress to en-

It is essential to fully understand the project's objectives and its planning and to always give them top priority. This may also mean that we as a vendor have to concede at a certain point. But because we are concentrated on the benefit of the overall project goals, we accept this without discussion.
Although BANK and the vendor companies had never interacted in a multisourcing setting before, they developed a joint mindset with shared norms and values, including a cross-organizational team spirit and absolute goal orientation. Thus, the formal control created room for informal controls to emerge.
The emergence of the joint mindset (i.e., an informal control mechanism) is perhaps clearest in IMPLEMENT's altered attitude. When the project started, IMPLEMENT expressed a different selfconcept than the other vendors because of its long and intense prior cooperation with BANK. This vendor was accustomed to a great deal of autonomy in its implementation activities, as well as limited control by BANK, the client.
In this focal project though, the multisourcing constellation moved certain tasks that IMPLEMENT had previously performed, such as the architectural framework and software testing, to other vendors. Furthermore, IMPLEMENT's design and implementation activities no longer were controlled by BANK but instead by another, partly competing vendor (ARCHITECT). Thus, IMPLE-MENT's project team needed to undergo a change in mindset about not only With regard to the effect of formal controls on interorganizational learning, we turn to an example from the ramp-up phase, when the vendors practiced and harmonized their cooperation and seized on opportunities to adjust their mutual expectations and needs. By practicing and reinforcing the allocation of tasks and required interactions during a fixed period at the beginning of the project, BANK ensured that the involved parties understood and accepted their own roles and responsibilities, as well as those of the other parties. In global, multisource, ISD outsourcing projects, the responsibility for service delivery is distributed, so cooperation between vendors must be established to ensure that individual service deliveries from the different areas of responsibility intertwine and lead to a successful overall service delivery. A member of BANK's project team summarized this essential phase:
In the course of this phase, we practiced and evaluated, based on selected business transactions, how the overall service delivery had been set up and how the performance was in terms of process and outcome quality.
The initialization of the multiparty cooperation also revealed performance deficits that could be attributed to national and organizational cultural differences. Such differences became manifest as divergent working modes, including values (e.g., sense of quality) and practices (e.g., knowledge transfer approaches). The project team actively addressed any conflicts or errors and used them as learning tools to improve subsequent interactions. We now describe the influence of informal controls and interorganizational learning on formal controls. It emerged from our data that in fact this influence is two-part. In the short-term, both informal control and learning mechanisms generated valuable operational information that enabled the parties to adjust their formal control mechanisms on a granular level. Then in the mid-to long-term, the informal control mechanisms and interorganizational learning processes contributed to lessen the need for formal controls. That is, our data indicated that the impact changes over time. In the following, we provide two examples to describe this effect.
During the ramp-up phase, as we noted previously, the vendors practiced and adjusted their cooperation to ensure a smoothly integrated service delivery. The parties therefore identified functional, process, and technological issues and noted performance deficits, which enabled them to deduce important operational information and then sharpen their project tracking (i.e., short-term effect on formal control). A project team member explained:
From my point of view, the rampup phase at the beginning of the project was very important and reasonable. As we had to deliver very early, we had to deal with problems very early as well. As a consequence, the impact of these problems could be minimized through rescheduling, and further mitigation measures could be initiated.
At the beginning of the project, BANK strongly encouraged cooperation among the vendors to reinforce their roles and responsibilities and foster a stable working mode. However, this coordination and control effort gradually decreased, replaced by self-organizing mechanisms within the increasingly well-established multivendor cooperation (i.e., mid-tolong term effect on formal control). Thus the reduction of formal management effort resulted from interorganizational learning processes, as described by a project manager from IMPLEMENT:
At the beginning, [BANK] 
Finding 2: Mitigating Effects on Cultural Differences
We now describe the mitigating effect of the interplay between control mechanisms and interorganizational learning on cultural differences in global, multisource, ISD outsourcing projects. It emerged from our data that these mechanisms can help partners overcome national and organizational cultural differences by harmonizing their varied workrelated values and practices. That is, our data indicated that the integrated use of formal and informal control and interorganizational learning dominate or overrule patterns of behavior which are rooted in national or organizational cultural differences; thus, differences in national and organizational cultures become less salient and the occurrence of culture-induced conflict declines. In the following, we describe this finding in more detail.
In the focal project, the interplay of formal and informal controls, together with interorganizational learning, helped mitigate the risks associated with national and organizational cultural differences. By creating transparency about each individual deliverable (i.e., through the use of the formal control mechanism "traceability matrix"), the parties assimilated their divergent assessments of quality and accuracy, at least to some extent. One project manager for the vendor stated: In parallel, divergent norms and values were being renegotiated and consolidated through the use of informal control and interorganizational learning processes. For example, while the development of a corporate, projectoriented mindset (i.e., informal management mechanism) helped mitigate organizational cultural differences by establishing a project culture, driven by team spirit and goal orientation, instances of interorganizational learning enabled the project team to cope with emerging differences in work-related practices. In summary, the interplay of formal and informal control and interorganizational learning enabled the project team to harmonize their divergent work-related values, norms, practices, and expectations, which resulted from national and organizational cultural differences. The findings described above are summarized in Table 5 .
Conclusion and Research Implications
With the goal of increasing our understanding of ways to mitigate cultural differences in global, multisource, ISD outsourcing projects, we apply an exploratory single-case study design. In turn, we can detail how formal and informal control mechanisms and interorganizational learning interact; furthermore, our data show that these interactions help mitigating cultural differences in such projects. To achieve this benefit though, the implementation of formal controls appears essential because it prepares the project for the emergence of informal controls and interorganizational learning. Project partners also should anticipate changes in the effects of informal control and interorganizational learning over time, shifting from feedback and information that support the design of formal controls (short term) to an actually reduced need for and use of formal controls (mid-to long term). Together, these mechanisms can help partners overcome national and organizational cultural differences by harmonizing their varied work-related values and practices.
With these findings, this study contributes to global IS outsourcing literature and provides a clearer understanding of ways to deal with cultural differences in global, multisource, ISD outsourcing projects. Furthermore, we contribute to research into control dynamics in global IS projects: this study illustrates that changes in control modes across project phases can be triggered by external factors (e.g., project context, stakeholder context, and global context as revealed by Kirsch 2004) , but also through the interplay of control modes within a single project's control portfolio. Finally, the detailed case analysis offers implications for global sourcing practices. The potential to reduce formal controls offers an important benefit for project managers of global, multisource, ISD outsourcing projects, as well as a likely reduction of the high management overhead costs normally associated with such projects.
However, we also note several limitations. First, we did not have the opportunity to interview any representatives from one of the vendors, TEST, which was responsible for the software testing in a new factory in India. Second, the rampup phase for the test factory did not work out as planned, causing major problems for the project and its multiple vendors during the testing phase. In this case, the parties seemingly should have suffered great conflict, resulting from cultural differences. Surprisingly though, the cooperation was characterized by harmony, perhaps because each of the vendors had a prior business relationship with BANK. Further research should examine multisource, ISD outsourcing relationships in the context of newly composed vendor portfolios to examine this proposed explanation. Third, our results are specific to large, technology reengineering projects in the German financial services industry. Accordingly, we encourage researchers to continue to study the posed research question in other contexts and settings. Fourth, our analysis of the interplay of formal and informal management mechanisms and learning in global, multisource, ISD outsourcing projects could be extended to identify further aspects and reveal an increasingly differentiated picture of the interaction.
